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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Joseph Mauro contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during his trial by 
misrepresenting the law in her rebuttal closing statements to the jury, statements to 
which he contemporaneously objected.  Specifically, he asserts the prosecutor 
improperly represented the scope of what the State had to prove vis-à-vis the elements 
of the charge of aiding and abetting insurance fraud.  As a result, this Court should 
vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 After he and his then-girlfriend, Carol Holloway, broke up, Mr. Mauro made 
voluntary statements to both law enforcement and an insurance company 
representative informing them that Ms. Holloway had made a claim that her tractor had 
been stolen when, in fact, he had simply left it on a friend’s property.1  (Tr., p.149, 
Ls.1-17, p.173, L.9 - p.174, L.7.)  In his voluntary deposition with the insurance 
company, Mr. Mauro explained that Ms. Holloway had been in on the plan to hide the 
tractor and collect on the insurance policy, but she did not learn exactly where 
Mr. Mauro had taken the tractor until after making the claim.  (Exhibits, p.37, Ls.15-20, 
p.42, Ls.6-9.)  Mr. Mauro admitted he had reported the tractor stolen to the police.  
(See, e.g., Exhibits, p.36, Ls.3-24.)  Additionally, Mr. Mauro admitted he had discussed 
the claim with the claims adjuster.  (Exhibits, p.33, L.20 - p.34, L.11.)  Mr. Mauro also 
stated he had driven Ms. Holloway to the insurance office, but he did not accompany 
                                            
1 Ms. Holloway independently contacted the police through her attorney, reporting 
where the tractor could be found.  (Tr., p.158, L.22 - p.160, L.2.) 
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her while she made the claim on her policy.  (Exhibits, p.39, Ls.8-18.)  Ms. Holloway 
filled out a Sworn Proof of Loss statement with the insurance company, which stated it 
was her policy and she was the only owner of the tractor.  (Exhibits, p.1.)  In that sworn 
statement, she also asserted:   
I did not intentionally cause this loss, nor did I conspire with others to 
cause it.  All property, both real and personal, mentioned in this sworn 
proof of loss or contained in the attached schedules was destroyed, 
stolen, or damaged at the time of the loss.  I have not concealed property 
from the company and have made no attempt to deceive the company in 
any manner about the extent of this loss.  
 
(Exhibits, p.1.)   
Ultimately, Mr. Mauro was charged with insurance fraud.  (R., pp.29-30.)  
Specifically, the State alleged: 
[Mr.] Mauro . . . did aid and abet another in presenting false information to 
[the insurance company] in support of a claim for payment of a benefit 
under an insurance policy, with the knowledge that the information was 
false as to a material issue of the claim, and with the intent to defraud or 
deceive [the insurance company] by claiming that his [sic] insured vehicle 
had been stolen. 
 
(R., p.29.)  Ms. Holloway was not charged in relation to these events.  (See Tr., p.203, 
Ls.4-7.) 
 Mr. Mauro decided to exercise his right to a jury trial.  The State presented his 
statements to both law enforcement (Exhibit 2) and the insurance company (Exhibit 9) 
as evidence during the trial.  (See Tr., p.174, L.8 - p.177, L.25; Tr., p.190, L.20 - p.193, 
L.11)  The State also presented Ms. Holloway’s Sworn Proof of Loss statement. (Tr., 
p.142, L.6 - p.143, L.13.)  Although subpoenaed to testify at the trial, Ms. Holloway 
stood on her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.  (See Tr., p.188, L.11 - 
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p.189, L.22 (discussing Ms. Holloway’s decision out of the presence of the jury before 
she had been formally called to testify).) 
During his closing argument, defense counsel drew the jury’s attention to Jury 
Instruction 18, which instructed, inter alia:  “The participation of each defendant in the 
crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Tr., p.232, Ls.6-8; R., p.113.)  
Accordingly, defense counsel argued that, in order to prove Mr. Mauro had aided and 
abetted Ms. Holloway in making a false statement, the State had to prove Ms. Holloway 
had actually committed insurance fraud, in that she knew her claim was false at the time 
she made it.  (Tr., p.231, L.23 - p.232, L.9.)  He then argued the State had failed to 
carry its burden in that regard because the assertions Ms. Holloway made in the Sworn 
Proof of Loss statement, combined with the fact that she had not been charged in this 
matter, showed she did not have knowledge of a plan to defraud the insurance 
company.  (Tr., p.232, L.9 - p.233, L.8.)   
In her rebuttal statements, the prosecutor argued: 
Instruction 17 [the elements instruction] doesn’t have anything in there 
about whether or not Ms. Carol Holloway had knowledge.  This is about 
the knowledge that Mr. Mauro had, that when he assisted her, when he 
drove her to the insurance company to file that report, his knowledge, the 
information he provided her, that he reported the tractor stolen and that he 
filed the police report -- his knowledge that that was false.  It does not ask 
you to consider her knowledge -- 
 
(Tr., p.234, L.19 - p.235, L.2.)  Defense counsel objected to that argument, asserting the 
prosecutor had misstated the law.  (Tr., p.235, Ls.3-4.)  The district court did not 
expressly overrule or sustain the objection, saying instead, “the instructions do set forth 
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the law.  I’ll let the jury sort that out.”  (Tr., p.235, Ls.5-6.)  The jury ultimately found 
Mr. Mauro guilty of insurance fraud.2  (R., p.122.)   
The district court subsequently imposed a unified sentence of three years, with 
one year fixed, on Mr. Mauro, which it suspended for a two-year period of probation.  
(R., pp.144-48.)  Mr. Mauro filed a notice of appeal timely from the Judgment of 
Conviction.    (R., pp.158-60.) 
  
 
                                            
2 It also found Mr. Mauro guilty of a misdemeanor charge of resisting or obstructing law 








The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Misstating The Law To The Jury 
 
When the appellate courts review a claim of prosecutorial misconduct to which 
there was a contemporaneous objection, the appellate court will “determine factually if 
there was prosecutorial misconduct, then [will] determine whether the error was 
harmless.”  State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 868 (2014) (internal quotation omitted). 
A prosecutor commits misconduct by misstating the law during closing argument 
to the jury.  State v. Coffin, 146 Idaho 166, 170 (Ct. App. 2008).  The relevant law in this 
case is set forth in I.C. § 41-293.  (See R., pp.29-30.)  That statute has several 
subsections which define various means of committing insurance fraud.  See I.C. § 41-
293.  The language in the charging document (R., pp.29-30) and Jury Instruction 17 
(R., p.112) mirrors the language in I.C. § 41-293(b), which defines one type of insurance 
fraud as:  
Any person who, with intent to defraud or deceive an insurer assists, 
abets, solicits, or conspires with another to prepare or make any 
statement that is intended to be presented to any insurer, producer, 
practitioner or other person, in connection with, or in support of any claim 
for payment or other benefit, knowing that such statement contains false, 
incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material 
to such claim. 
 
I.C. § 41-293(b).  In her rebuttal closing statements, the prosecutor argued that 
Ms. Holloway’s knowledge of the falsity of the statement was irrelevant to a charge 
under this particular statute.  (Tr., p.234, L.19 - p.235, L.2.)  Both Idaho Supreme Court 
and Idaho Court of Appeals precedent reveal the prosecutor was mistaken.   
As the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, “To be an aider and abettor one 
must share the criminal intent of the principal; there must be a community of purpose in 
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the unlawful undertaking.”  State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 386 (1985) (internal 
quotation omitted).  This “community of purpose” requirement existed in the aid-and-
abet context even though I.C. § 18-204 provided, then as now, that, regardless of the 
nature of a person’s participation in the crime, all participants could be charged as 
principals of the offense.  As such, what the Scroggins Court said is:  even though all 
the people involved in the offense are equally culpable (i.e., they are all treated as 
“principals”), that common culpability arises because the participants share a common 
intent, a community of purpose.  Thus, if there is a person whose actions may forward 
the criminal goal, but who does not share in the community of purpose to achieve that 
goal, that person is not a culpable participant.  Compare State v. Perez, 99 Idaho 181, 
183 (1978) (explaining that the reason a confidential informant is not liable as an 
accomplice in the criminal act on which he is informing, even though he participates in 
the act, is that he “lacks the requisite criminal intent”).   
The Court of Appeals subsequently elaborated on this point, making the rule 
even clearer:  “mere knowledge of a crime or assent or acquiescence in its commission 
does not create accomplice liability through aiding and abetting.  Aiding and abetting 
contemplates a sharing by the aider and abettor of the criminal intent of the perpetrator.”  
State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, 383 (Ct. App. 2008); accord. State v. Romero-Garcia, 
139 Idaho 199, 204 (Ct. App. 2003); see also Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 
25-26 (1980) (explaining that, in prosecuting an accessory under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2, which 
also provides that all people involved in a crime are culpable as principals, the 
Government has “the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that [the principal] 
violated [the relevant statute] and that petitioner aided and abetted him in that venture”).  
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Thus, for the State to establish aid-and-abet liability, it has to show a joint criminal intent 
by both the accessory and the principal, in this case, Mr. Mauro and Ms. Holloway. 
Therefore, the prosecutor’s assertion – that Ms. Holloway’s knowledge was 
irrelevant, that all the State had to prove was that Mr. Mauro himself knew the statement 
was false (Tr., p.234, L.19 - p.235, L.2) – is a misstatement of the law.  Mr. Mauro’s 
“mere knowledge of a crime or assent or acquiescence in its commission” is not 
sufficient to establish aid-and-abet liability.  Mitchell, 146 Idaho at 383.  Rather, the jury 
has to conclude the State met its burden to prove there was a “community of purpose,” 
a shared criminal intent between Mr. Mauro and Ms. Holloway, in order to find the State 
met its burden to prove Mr. Mauro had aided and abetted in the making of a statement 
intended to deceive an insurance company in support of a claim.  Scroggins, 110 Idaho 
at 386.  Thus, the prosecutor committed misconduct by misrepresenting the law as to its 
burden of proof in this case. 
Since the prosecutor’s misrepresentation of the law reduced the burden of proof 
as to what the State had to prove vis-à-vis the elements of the offense, this Court 
should vacate Mr. Mauro’s conviction.  When the prosecutor commits this type of 
misconduct, it is no longer possible to determine whether the jury convicted based on 
the law as set forth in the instructions, or whether it followed the prosecutor’s erroneous 
representation of the law.3  See State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(quoting State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 43-44 (1903)) (acknowledging that prosecutors 
“occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to 
                                            
3 This is particularly true since the district court did not give a instruction clarifying what 
the instructions required the jury to find. 
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their statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the 
jury than they will give to counsel for the accused.”)  In cases where it is not possible to 
determine whether the verdict was based on a proper or improper theory, “this court 
must vacate the conviction and remand the case for a new trial.”  State v. Luke, 134 
Idaho 294, 301 (2000).  Put another way, the State will be unable to meet its burden to 
prove there is not a reasonable possibility that the error in this case did not contribute to 
the verdict actually rendered by the jury, and thus, that the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010) (articulating the 
standard for objected-to error); cf. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993).  As 
such, the misconduct in this case amounts to reversible error. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Mr. Mauro respectfully requests this Court vacate the judgment of conviction and 
remand this case for a new trial. 
 DATED this 7th day of October, 2016. 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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